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EAST-WEST DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDE IN THE EU:  
A REGIONAL OVERVIEW  
Marko GALJAK ∗  
 
The goal was to examine demographic differences between former communist regions and 
other regions of the EU. Besides providing a regional overview of EU’s demographic 
differences, we question whether the subnational approach offers any new insights into the 
East-West divide. This cross-sectional study was conducted on 1,155 EU’s NUTS3 regions 
from 2014. These regions are grouped in two groups: regions that were part of a com-
munist country, and other regions. Mortality, fertility and age structure indicators were 
tested between the two groups of regions. GDP/c was used to control for differences in 
economic development by segmenting the regions into tree brackets: low, medium, and 
high. The differences were then tested for each indicator. Regional variation within coun-
tries for each indicator was also assessed. The gaps exist at regional level and are the 
widest with mortality and fertility schedule, regardless of GDP/c. Former communist 
regions on average tend to be slightly younger. Analysis of regional variation showed that 
subnational approach was warranted when studying East-West demographic disparities, 
especially when it comes to fertility schedule. 
Keywords: former communist countries, mortality, fertility, ageing, Europe, NUTS 3  
Introduction 
Much research in the field of demography confirms that countries which 
used to have the communist political system, have distinct demographic 
characteristics (Billingsley, 2010; Mesle, Vallin, 2002; Minagawa, 2013; 
Sobotka, 2003). Different economic systems, different levels of personal 
and political freedoms, isolation and many other factors, all contributed to 
this distinctiveness that many demographic and socioeconomic indicators 
reflect. Among those are differences in mortality, fertility and the result-
ing age structure. 
Europe’s East-West mortality gap was the focus of numerous studies since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall (Caselli et al., 2002; Grigoriev et al., 2014; 
Meslé, 2004; Mesle, Vallin, 2002; Vallin, Meslé, 2004). They all conclude 
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that countries in Eastern Europe have higher mortality rates than their 
counterparts in the Western Europe. Though this gap is closing, the mo-
mentum varies across many facets. One facet is geographical; some coun-
tries are converging quickly, others less so. There are also other facets of 
this gap; one is age specific; another is cause-specific (of death). When it 
comes to mortality, this study will focus on geographical and age facets of 
the mortality gap. 
Fertility gap in Europe does not share the same borders with the mortality 
gap, namely, besides Eastern and Central Europe lowest low fertility was 
endemic across South Europe since 1990 (Kohler et al., 2002). While 
contrasting Western and Northern European countries, especially France 
and Sweden, achieved relatively high fertility rates, former communist 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe went through (socioeconomical-
ly) turbulent 1990s. During this period low fertility in those countries 
appeared largely as an effect of the delay of childbearing (Sobotka, 2003). 
Both economic and cultural factors to varying degree affected the timing 
of childbearing (Mynarska, 2010). Only after the end of fertility age of a 
given cohort we can know for certain whether the fertility is truly going 
up or down and at which rate. While the East’s cohort fertility rates are 
yet to begin recuperating, the recuperation in the West has already started 
with the 1956-1960 cohort (Castro, 2015). According to current trends 
cohort fertility is not likely to increase in the foreseeable future in Central 
and Eastern European countries, decline or stagnation are more likely 
scenarios (Frejka, Gietel-Basten, 2016). Although not included in this 
study, Serbia and Croatia are former communist countries, characterized 
by contraction of the fertile age group, coupled with low fertility rates of 
their most fertile, 20-24 age group (Magdalenić, Vojković, 2015), con-
firming that they are more similar to countries like Poland and Romania. 
The historical gap in mean age at childbearing between East and West 
does seem to be closing quickly, at least in some countries (Burkimsher, 
2015). With this nearing convergence, it is not surprising that diminishing 
effect of the childbearing delay is primarily responsible for recent upturns 
in period fertility across Europe (Bongaarts, Sobotka, 2012). Spéder and 
Kapitány (2014) pointed out that there is a failure to realize fertility inten-
tions in certain Eastern European countries, and suggested that social an-
omy, characteristic for post-communist countries, may be the at the root 
of their low fertility problem. 
Current age structure is the direct consequence of fertility and mortality 
patterns. Population ageing is the problem facing all European countries 
to varying degree (Keenan et al., 2016). It is, therefore, important to ex-
amine the etiology of any instance of population ageing, since both low 
levels of mortality and fertility can be the causes. On the one hand, there 
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is ageing from the top, caused by lowering mortality rates, present in most 
of the developed countries, i.e. the ones with highest life expectancy. On 
the other, there is ageing from the bottom, caused by low fertility rates. 
This ageing from the bottom is reality facing all of the former communist 
countries. Ageing from the top, caused by rising number of the very old, is 
a phenomenon affecting mainly European countries that did not belong to 
the Eastern bloc. 
The regional approach 
The bulk of research on East-West demographic differentiation in Europe 
compares countries which used to have communist regimes to those that 
did not. One problem with this approach is that there is a sharp difference 
in the economic development of former communist countries and the rest 
of Europe. Almost all former communist countries have lower gross do-
mestic product per capita (GDP/c) than rest of the countries of the EU 
(except Slovenia). The huge disparity in economic development can ob-
fuscate many of the demographic and sociological phenomena that we 
study. The wealthy countries can have underdeveloped regions, and for-
mer communist countries that are poor can have regions which are more 
developed. This problem of economic development disparity can be, at 
least partially, circumvented by comparing regions of similar economic 
development. Although it is not a perfect (apples–to–apples) comparison, 
this approach offers insights that can be lost in the usual national ap-
proach. 
Uneven economic regional development in the EU has been studied ex-
tensively (Ballas et al., 2017; Boldrin, Canova, 2001; Bouvet, 2010; 
Rodríguez-Pose, Tselios, 2009) and has been a hot topic in terms of EU’s 
policy. Regional demographic differences, on the other hand, have been 
studied mainly in the national context, rather than on EU level. There is a 
good reason for that. Many demographic phenomena are country specific. 
On the policy side, measures to effect demography are by definition prob-
lematic, and not to mention more difficult. Ageing, as the final product of 
demographic processes, and particularly its effects on economy are in-
creasingly popular subject for regional research (Álvarez, Morollón, 2016; 
Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2016; Van Der Gaag, de Beer, 2015).  
Another problem with comparing country to country is that today’s na-
tional borders do not completely follow the pre-1989 divide. If we were to 
view Germany as a whole, the characteristics of the former communist 
East would not be as pronounced. The subnational approach is being used 
increasingly (Bryant, Graham, 2013; Johnson et al., 2015; Klüsener et al., 
2013) with ever growing data availability.  
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Nevertheless, there are important caveats with the research of regional 
demographics of Europe. Even though Communism probably left its 
marks, the East-West demographic differentiation was present well before 
its establishment. We know that infant mortality had started falling in 
Western Europe at the end of 19th century (Corsini, Viazzo, 1993), and 
the demographic transition, and with it mortality transition, started earlier 
in the West than in East Europe, resulting in differing population struc-
tures. Historically, there were even differences between Eastern and 
Western German principalities, which now correspond to the federal states 
of Germany (Klüsener, Goldstein, 2016). Hence, already existing dispari-
ties were accentuated by the changes to come in the 20th century. Alt-
hough former communist countries of Europe had differing experiences, 
many of which were beneficial (such as rapid industrialization of mainly 
agrarian societies), the net effect of the communist social experiment on 
countries’ demographic characteristics is widely perceived to be negative. 
Even though the communist experience had in itself affected the demog-
raphy, so did the period of economic and political transition, after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, which was turbulent and marked by recession and 
poverty.  
Demographic, regional studies are often intranational, focusing on all or 
specific regions within one country. In this study, we explore demograph-
ic characteristics at regional level transnationally to examine how regions 
of the former communist countries compare to the other regions of the 
EU, while controlling for economic development. That is, to offer a 
glimpse of EU’s regions’ demographic characteristics and examine the 
differentiation. We explore regional variations of demographic indicators 
within the two blocs and within each country. Furthermore, the regional 
approach to studying demographic phenomena can offer new insights 
needed to encourage interdisciplinary research and help policy makers. 
Data and methodology 
Data 
The lowest regional level with available demographic data for the compar-
ison is NUTS 3 level. NUTS stands for the Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics, and level 3 is a region with population size anywhere 
between 150 000 and 800 000 people. All data, including vital statistics 
and population age and sex structure data, is provided by Eurostat 
(2017a). The most recent year of the data that is available for a significant 
portion of NUTS 3 regions is 2014. The Eurostat database contains data 
on 1632 NUTS 3 regions. However, the data is not complete, i.e. the data 
are missing for some countries and regions. Further, the mentioned num-
East-West Demographic Divide in the EU: A Regional Overview 
STANOVNIŠTVO, 2018, 56(2): 1-21 
5 
ber of regions includes overseas territories, as well as all the NUTS 3 re-
gions of Turkey, which are outside the scope of this study. The reasoning 
behind this exclusion is the absence of former communist counterpart 
regions with traditionally higher fertility rates from the dataset (e.g. Alba-
nia, Kosovo). The final number of regions included in the analysis is 
1,155 from 26 different countries, out of which 268 regions are from 8 
former communist countries. All 1,155 regions belong to the European 
Union member states.  
R package “eurostat” was used (Lahti et al., 2017) for data acquisition. 
One instance of erroneous viral statistics data was found in the case of 
single German region (Altenburger Land), so the data from German na-
tional statistics was used instead (German Federal Statistical Office, 
2017). Geographic information system (GIS) data used for maps was pro-
vided by Eurostat/GISCO (2017b; 2017c). 
Indicators 
Since the goal of this study is to discern the difference between popula-
tions of European regions, a wide variety of mortality, fertility and age 
structure indicators was used (21 in total). The limiting factor being the 
data availability. 
Mortality indicators include crude death rate (CDR), standardized mortali-
ty rate (SMR), life expectancy at birth (LE0) and the age of 65 (LE65). 
While Eurostat directly provided crude death rate, the rest of the mortality 
indicators were computed. Revised standard European population (Pace et 
al., 2013) as used to calculate standardized mortality rates. Life expectan-
cy indicators were computed using abridged life tables, constructed from 
vital statistics and age structure estimates provided by Eurostat. 
Fertility indicators include crude birth rate (CBR), total fertility rate (TFR 
– average number of children per woman), general fertility rate (GFR – 
number of children per 1000 fertile age women), age specific fertility rates 
(ASFR) and mean age at childbearing (MAC). Like CDR, CBR was di-
rectly provided by Eurostat, while other fertility indicators were comput-
ed. TFR includes ASFR for 10–14 and 50–54 age groups, while GFR is 
calculated per 1000 women aged 15-49. ASFRs are given for five-year 
age groups, beginning with the 10–14 and ending with the 50–54 age 
group. MAC was calculated using the same data. 
For general indicators of age structure mean age and median age were 
chosen along with ageing index (AI), as a proportion of people older than 
65 and those younger than 15. However, there is also a need to examine 
the age structure in the context of fertility, so fertility ratio (FR) was also 
chosen. Fertility ratio was calculated as a percentage of females aged 14-
49 in the total population. 
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There were too few regions with available data for calculating GDP/c for 
2014, so the data from 2013 was used. This approach was preferable to 
the imputation of the many missing values for 2014. Furthermore, the 
discrepancies between data are tolerable given that we do not use it as a 
continuous variable but as binning criteria (see below for details).  
Statistical analysis 
The entire dataset (N=1,155) was split into two groups: former communist 
(n=314) regions and other regions (n=841). The groups were then com-
pared for each indicator using t-test. Although data violates the parametric 
assumption of normality, sheer sample size makes t-test appropriate. Due 
to unequal sample sizes between the groups, Welch’s t-test was used. 
Another advantage of Welch’s t-test is its robustness to heteroscedasticity 
(Welch, 1947), which was present with nearly all of the indicators be-
tween the two groups. 
The problem of economic development disparity and its possible effects 
on demographic phenomena was addressed by separating regions into 
three groups depending on their GDP/c: low, medium and high. Since 
there are fewer former communist regions, they were used to determine 
grouping criteria. Their GDP/c ranged from €2846 (in Bulgarian Silistra 
Province) to €36762 (in Eastern German city Potsdam). This range was 
split three-way using Jenks natural breaks classification method, and then 
other regions were assigned to GDP/c bracket they belong to: 
• low (GDP/c < €13983), with 212 former communist regions and 51 
other regions 
• medium (GDP/c €13983–€25821) with 78 former communist regions 
and 291 other regions 
• high (GDP/c > €25821) with 24 former communist regions and 499 
other regions 
This approach was preferable to using GDP/c as a continuous variable in 
an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) or multiple regression models 
which would violate the assumptions with many of the indicators used. 
Robustness of Welch’s t-test to unequal sample sizes (Fagerland, Sandvik, 
2009), makes it a more suitable alternative. Furthermore, the results ob-
tained using the selected approach are easier to interpret and understand, 
than the results obtained using the alternatives in the form of general line-
ar models. 
Regional variation was examined in two ways: internationally, by compar-
ing the two groups of regions while ignoring national borders and intrana-
tionally, by considering regional variations within each country. We use 
the coefficient of variation (CV), calculated as a ratio of the standard de-
viation and the mean for each demographic indicator. Krishnamoorthy & 
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Lee’s (2014) modified signed-likelihood ratio test (M-SLRT) for equality 
of CVs was used to determine whether the differences in relative variance 
are significant internationally between the two groups. To test whether the 
regional variation in former communist countries differs from other coun-
tries of the EU we use Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon U test on CVs comput-
ed for each country. 
Results 
Means comparison 
Results of the Welch’s t-test between the two groups in Table 1 show 
significant differences across many of the demographic indicators tested.  
 
Table 1  
Mean comparison of demographic indicators between the former communist 
and other regions 
 µ  t 
Indicators 
Former 
communist 
n=314 
Other 
n=841 t 
Low 
GDP/c 
n=262 
Medium 
GDP/c 
n=369 
High 
GDP/c 
n=523 
CDR 12.26 10.24 -12.84*** -3.42*** -6.76*** –4.72*** 
LE0 77.26 81.59 29.71*** 23.76*** 11.52*** 5.48*** 
LE65 17.68 20.17 29.64*** 18.28*** 12.37*** 4.14*** 
SMR 9.59 6.94 -27.31*** -21.97*** -11.61*** –5.51*** 
CBR 9.22 9.02 -2.08* -10.58*** 1.16 0.35 
TFR 1.5 1.54 3.2** -9.84*** -1.92 4.29*** 
GFR 42.07 41.36 -2.16* -10.15*** -4.32*** –1.97 
ASFR 10–14  0.47 0.08 -7.1*** -2.76** -1.3 –1.97 
ASFR 15–19  19.87 6.93 -16.16*** -11.24*** -8.14*** –7.88*** 
ASFR 20–24  58.04 38.64 -15.91*** -15.25*** -7.03*** –0.91 
ASFR 25–29  96.42 92.58 -3.05** -11.52*** -4.77*** 3.37** 
ASFR 30–34  81.16 104.31 22.07*** 3.81*** 4.2*** 5.42*** 
ASFR 35–39  36.22 53.83 26.12*** 9.35*** 9.94*** 1.77 
ASFR 40–44  6.57 10.56 22.68*** 5.38*** 12.71*** 2.82** 
ASFR 45–49  0.29 0.6 15.28*** 6.7*** 9.97*** 2.55* 
ASFR 50–54  0.01 0.05 10.18*** 3.15** 6.66*** 4.04*** 
MAC 29.22 31.05 23.39*** 17.44*** 10.81*** 3.74*** 
FR 0.28 0.28 2.44* -3.23** 6.91*** 2.54* 
AI 1.39 1.45 2.01* 7.24*** -5.59*** –5.77*** 
Mean age  42.91 43.41 2.72** 7.45*** -5.83*** –4.75*** 
Median age  43.26 44.19 3.61*** 6.52*** -5.42*** –2.91** 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
µ – mean for each of the two groups 
t – statistic for Welch’s t test 
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The difference in mortality indicators is the starkest, which was expected 
since the same difference is well known at the national level (Mesle, Val-
lin, 2002). This differentiation follows the economic development gap, 
which is not surprising given the relationship between economic devel-
opment and mortality indicators (Preston, 1975). Mean LE0 is 4.33 years 
shorter in regions of former communist countries. The differences in LE0 
are significant regardless of the GDP/c bracket. That is to say when we 
compare mortality indicators of regions with similar GDP/c, the regions 
that used to be communist still stand out significantly. Mortality gap exists 
regardless of economic development; though the higher GDP/c is, the 
narrower the mortality gap becomes. Such results may partially be due to 
the logarithmic nature of the relationship between GDP/c and LE0, first 
described by Preston (1975). Namely, the differences in the GDP/c within 
the low bracket account for greater gains in LE0, than the same differ-
ences in the high GDP/c bracket. 
Fertility gap between the two groups of regions is not as wide. TFR is 
higher in other regions. When the regions are compared within three 
GDP/c brackets, the results show that these differences in fertility are not 
uniform and that they depend on the particular GDP/c context. Among the 
poorest regions, the ones from former communist countries tend to have 
higher TFR – in the medium bracket, there are no significant differences 
in TFR – in the highest GDP/c bracket, other regions tend to have higher 
TFR.  
The aspect of fertility that differs the most between the two groups is fer-
tility schedule, best reflected by 1.83 years lower MAC in former com-
munist regions. Mothers in Western and particularly Southern Europe are 
delaying motherhood more than mothers in former communist countries. 
The ASFRs reflect the same fertility schedule difference. Former com-
munist regions have higher fertility rates between the ages of 10–29, while 
the other regions have higher rates for older ages (30–54). However, low-
er MAC does not mean higher fertility and vice versa, there are regions 
with similar MAC and markedly different levels of TFR, like some of the 
regions of Poland and France or Ireland and Spain (Figure 1).  
As it was the case with fertility indicators, differences in age structure 
between the two groups of regions are much less pronounced than the 
differences in mortality. There is no significant difference in AI, but mean 
and median age are lower in former communist regions, 0.5 and 0.93 
years respectively. When GDP/c is taken into account the differences in 
ageing become even more evident. Namely, when we look only at lower 
GDP/c regions, the ones that used to be communist tend to be younger, 
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Figure 1  
Selected demographic indicators in the EU at NUTS 3 level 
 
measured by all of the ageing indicators used. In medium and high GDP/c 
brackets, the other regions tend to be younger. 
Regional variation 
CVs within each of the two groups of regions show greater variation 
among former communist regions with mortality, ageing and fertility 
schedule indicators, but not with the indicators of fertility levels, which 
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vary more in other regions (Table 2). Greater variation of fertility levels 
among other regions is due to big differences between regions from 
Southern European countries and the rest of the EU’s non-communist 
regions. Test for equality of CVs (M-SLRT) showed that these differences 
were significant with almost all indicators (except some of the ASFRs). 
GDP/c also varies more among former communist regions. 
 
Figure 2  
Regional variation of CDR LE0 and GDP/c in former communist and other 
countries of the EU 
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Besides calculating CVs for the two groups of regions, CVs for each 
country were calculated as well, in order to ascertain the level of intrana-
tional regional variation of demographic indicators (Table 2). Regional 
income inequality (measured by GDP/c) is greater in former communist 
countries. In comparison, no demographic indicator shows such a big 
difference between former communist and countries in terms of regional 
inequality. 
Figure 3  
Regional variation of TFR, MAC and AI in former communist and other 
countries of the EU 
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MAC, which is a correlate of GDP/c, comes close, being the demographic 
indicator that also varies more in former communist countries. Another 
strong correlate of GDP/c, namely LE0, shows significant differences in 
regional inequality between the two groups of countries (Table 2).   
 
Table 2 
Regional variation of demographic indicators, at transnational 
 and intranational level 
 CV  Median CV  
Indicators 
Former 
communist 
regions 
Other 
regions 
 
M-SLRT 
Former 
communist 
countries 
Other 
countries 
 
U 
CDR 0.21 0.17 15.7*** 0.12 0.14 111 
LE0 0.03 0.02 277.25*** 0.01 0.01 48* 
LE65 0.08 0.05 139.4*** 0.03 0.03 61 
SMR 0.17 0.11 119.22*** 0.07 0.07 77 
CBR 0.14 0.19 30.31*** 0.11 0.13 109 
TFR 0.12 0.17 51.86*** 0.07 0.08 79 
GFR 0.09 0.17 125.84*** 0.08 0.09 93 
ASFR 10–14 2.07 3.28 6.55* 1.19 1.6 95 
ASFR 15–19 0.71 0.52 24.12*** 0.43 0.31 69 
ASFR 20–24 0.34 0.37 2.8 0.25 0.21 75 
ASFR 25–29 0.15 0.3 158.48*** 0.1 0.15 134* 
ASFR 30–34 0.19 0.17 6.08* 0.11 0.09 51 
ASFR 35–39 0.27 0.2 38.97*** 0.16 0.13 76 
ASFR 40–44 0.32 0.35 2.84 0.23 0.23 81 
ASFR 45–49 0.8 0.74 0.99 0.72 0.58 65 
ASFR 50–54 4.62 2.21 12.22*** 2.32 1.57 71 
MAC 0.04 0.03 27.12*** 0.03 0.02 25*** 
FR 0.08 0.06 40*** 0.03 0.05 119 
AI 0.35 0.26 34.11*** 0.18 0.2 116 
Mean age 0.07 0.05 40.13*** 0.03 0.04 122 
Median age 0.1 0.07 72.7*** 0.04 0.06 126 
GDP/c 0.65 0.45 42.07*** 0.43 0.27 17*** 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
CV – coefficient of variation 
M-SLRT – modified signed-likelihood ratio test statistic 
U – Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon U test statistic 
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Discussion 
Findings 
The relationship between mortality and economic development is likely 
behind the high regional variation of mortality indicators in former com-
munist regions, which exhibit higher variation in GDP/c as well. Howev-
er, high regional variation within countries in LE0 isn’t endemic to former 
communist countries. The country which exhibited highest regional varia-
tion in LE0 is Belgium, due to the differences between Flanders and Wal-
lonia, that reflect differences in GDP/c. Mortality divide in Germany does 
not run only on East-West axis but on North–South axis as well, i.e. life 
expectancy is longer in southern Germany (Figure 1), matching the re-
gional variation of economic conditions (Kibele et al., 2015). 
Not only do former communist countries have younger mothers, but the 
variation of MAC within former communist countries is significantly 
higher. This is due to bigger discrepancies between urban and rural MAC 
in the former communist countries. Namely, there is a tendency for big 
urban centres to have higher MAC than the peripheral, rural regions. The 
urban–rural MAC discrepancies exist in the rest of the EU as well (e.g. 
Parisian and Stockholm regions stand out from other French and Swedish 
regions), but this discrepancy is more pronounced in the East (e.g. MAC 
in Bulgarian Sofia region is almost 31 years, while in the Sliven province 
it is nearly 25 years).  
The relationship between economic development and fertility exists at the 
global scale, as there are many poor countries with high fertility, which 
are yet to transition to low fertility. Given that all of the EU’s countries 
completed the fertility transition decades ago, the same relationship can-
not be observed in this geographic context. Furthermore, the emergence of 
lowest–low fertility in the 90’s in Europe is not a phenomenon that fol-
lows the economic development fault lines, as the relatively well off 
Southern European countries are affected by it as well as Eastern Europe-
an countries (Kohler et al., 2002). The comparison of TFR between the 
two groups of regions showed that fertility is only just lower in former 
communist countries. That result tells us little on the actual differences in 
fertility. Namely, the “other” regions of the EU are split between regions 
of countries that have low fertility (Italy, Spain, Germany) and those that 
have near replacement level fertility that have gone through the second 
demographic transition like France, Ireland and Sweden (Lesthaeghe, 
2014). Partitioning the data-set into three groups based on GDP/c helped 
little to address this problem. The low GDP/c bracket consists of poorer 
regions of countries that are predominantly affected by low fertility: Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal. When compared to those regions, former communist 
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regions in the same GDP/c bracket showed higher TFR. There was no 
significant difference in the medium bracket. In the high GDP/c bracket, 
other regions tend to have higher TFR. This bracket includes many North-
ern European countries’ regions, which contribute to that result.  
While former communist Europe is far from a monolith block regarding 
fertility, the rest of the EU is split. Therefore, it is not surprising that there 
is more variation in fertility levels in the latter group. This applies to all 
fertility indicators (except for MAC, whose variation is higher in the for-
mer communist group). The urban–rural discrepancies that exist in fertili-
ty schedule, are not as pronounced in TFR. Though, the highest fertility 
regions of France are clustered around Paris (Île de France), the same is 
not true for other countries. Regional variation of TFR within countries is 
highest in low fertility countries, leading with Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Portugal, and regional TFR differences there have little to do with rural–
urban divide (Figure 1). 
Given the way they are calculated, indicators like CDR, CBR and GFR 
depend on age structure. Discrepancies between the results obtained when 
comparing means of regional GFR, CBR, and TFR, come down mostly to 
differences in age structure. For instance, due to unbalanced age structure 
(high AI, low FR), fertile age females make up a smaller percentage of 
total population in East Germany. Those females have lately achieved 
comparatively higher TFR than their counterparts in the West (Goldstein, 
Kreyenfeld, 2011). In that case, TFR is high, but in regard to the total 
population those gains would be registered as meager, and result in lower 
CBR. This trend of declining CBR and TFR has been observed in France 
at the national level in 2014 (Mazuy et al., 2015). Similarly, an imbalance 
in the age structure of fertile age women accounts for differences between 
TFR and GFR. 
When we directly compared the two groups of regions, results showed 
former communist regions tended to be slightly younger than other re-
gions, measured by mean and median age. Results of the comparisons of 
AI between the groups revealed no significant differences. This discrep-
ancy between the two measures of ageing exists since AI ignores the mid-
dle segment of the population (15–65). Higher fertility in the West for the 
past decades made the 0–15 population segment bigger than in their East-
ern counterparts, but at the same time, lower mortality rates in the West 
also made older than the 65 segment of the population larger. That is why 
the ratio of the two age groups does not significantly differ between the 
two groups. The discrepancy between AI and mean and median age, tells 
us that the real difference lies in the 15–65 segment of the population. 
Reher (2015) distinguishes between two types of countries: the ones 
where the baby boom was strong, and the baby bust was relatively weak 
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(Type A), and where the baby boom was weak, and the bust appears to 
have been strong (Type B). He points out that ageing will be much harder 
for the Type B countries. Former communist regions studied here belong 
to Type B countries. 
When examined by GDP/c brackets, mean and median age show that 
among the lower GDP/c regions former communist regions are younger. 
This is the result of the stark mortality difference in the lower GDP/c 
bracket, which was found to be the biggest demographic difference be-
tween the regions. In that group, poorest former communist regions are 
compared to poorest regions of other countries that tend to be regions of 
the Mediterranean countries, famous for their traditionally lower old age 
mortality rates and longer life expectancies (Mesle, Vallin, 2002). The 
product of high mortality in the poorest former communist regions is a lot 
smaller older population, which results in the younger population. One 
important point regarding mortality, and its effect on age structure is that 
the differences between sexes are much higher in former communist coun-
tries (Botev, 2012). Among regions with medium and high GDP/c, where 
mortality differences are not as great, other regions tend to be younger. 
Migration has a major role in shaping the age structure, especially on re-
gional level. Although not included in this study, its effects are evident in 
regional variation of ageing indicators, particularly of AI. Where mean 
and median age give us a more thorough picture of age structure, AI helps 
us identify regions with unbalanced age structure. Variation of AI showed 
that former communist regions as a whole are much more varied in this 
regard. However, regional variation within each country revealed that 
countries with highest regional variation of AI are Spain and Portugal, 
countries with well-known regional income inequalities (Martínez-
Galarraga et al., 2015; Santana, 2000). The regional variation of AI 
doesn’t significantly differ between the former communist and other 
countries of the EU. 
Limitations and future research 
This paper offers a rough overview of the regional differences. The main 
limitation being its transversal nature, i.e. being a single year snapshot of 
the demographic situation. Future research should add time as another 
dimension which could provide us with the trends as far as possible into 
the past. Viewing the changes at regional level from the 1989 on the EU 
level would help us learn how did the demographic indicators changed 
during the turbulent period at regional level. Another limitation of this 
paper is regarding the aspect of migration which is absent from this re-
search but plays a major role with many of the demographic phenomena, 
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especially when it comes to age structure. Future research should include 
migration component, which would be a big challenge considering the 
lack of reliable data, especially at lower administrative levels. Adding 
more socioeconomic variables beside GDP/c would do a lot to help ex-
plain the differences between the two groups examined in this paper.  
Conclusion 
Demographic distinctiveness of former communist countries, apparent at 
the national level, is present at the regional scale as well. Former com-
munist countries and their regions are demographically distinct in almost 
every aspect. Their differentiation is pronounced the most with mortality 
indicators, i.e. mortality conditions are worse in the East. When compared 
with other regions of similar GDP/c, former communist regions still ex-
hibit significantly lower life expectancy. Albeit, fertility on average tends 
to be a bit lower in former communist regions; it is the contrast in fertility 
schedule that truly divides the two groups. Mothers from former com-
munist regions are on average much younger, and that holds true regard-
less of GDP/c. The former communist regions do tend to be slightly 
younger. However, the higher mortality rates in the East played a big part 
in shaping that younger age structure in the East. This is especially the 
case with economically less developed former communist regions. Former 
communist regions are a more heterogeneous group when it comes to 
mortality and age structure, while other regions showed greater heteroge-
neity of fertility. Even though it’s important to examine regional variation 
transnationally, it is also important to consider regional variation national-
ly. These two different contexts offer answers to different questions, espe-
cially policy-wise. In the national context, life expectancy and fertility 
schedule vary more within former communist countries. Surprisingly, the 
measure of young/old balance (AI) does not vary the most in former 
communist countries, but in countries of Southern Europe.  
Is the subnational approach warranted in studying East-West demographic 
differences in the EU? In case of Germany, it certainly is due to its unique 
history, but is it preferable in general EU context? The short, but not com-
plete, answer is yes. It depends on the demographic phenomena being 
studied. The case can be made that there is little to be gained when study-
ing the differences in mortality subnationally since the differences be-
tween East and West are as obvious at regional as they are obvious at the 
national level. Still, there are important regional differences in mortality, 
in some of the countries that need to be acknowledged. When it comes to 
fertility levels, considering the national context is paramount, which 
makes subnational approach less warranted. However, fertility schedule is 
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the aspect of fertility where subnational approach should be preferable, 
given the differences in regional variation. 
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Marko Galjak ∗ 
Demografski jaz između istoka i zapada Evropske unije: Regionalni pregled 
R e z i m e  
Cilj ovog rada je da istraži razlike u demografskim pokazateljima između regiona 
Evropske unije u odnosu na to da li su pripadali bivšim komunističkim državama 
ili nisu. U radu je problem demografskog jaza između istočne i zapadne Evrope 
sagledan na regionalnom nivou. Osim tog pregleda, u radu se postavlja pitanje da 
li je važno ispitivati razlike u pojedinim demografskim pokazateljima između 
bivših komunističkih država i ostalih država EU na administrativnom nivou ni-
žem od državnog? Ova transverzalna studija je sprovedena koristeći podatke 
1.155 NUTS 3 regiona Evropske unije iz 2014. godine. NUTS 3 regioni su podeljeni 
u dve grupe u zavisnosti od toga da li su pripadali Istočnom bloku ili ne. Ispitan je 
21 demografski pokazatelj među kojima su pokazatelji mortaliteta, fertiliteta i 
starosne strukture. Dodatno, očigledne razlike u ekonomskoj razvijenosti regiona 
kontrolisane su pomoću bruto domaćeg proizvoda po stanovniku (BDP/c). Na 
bazi BDP/c, regioni su podeljeni u tri grupe: nizak, srednji, visok. Prema toj po-
deli, testirana je razlika između dve grupe regiona za svaki pokazatelj. Tako je 
ispitana regionalna varijacija na nivou cele EU. Dodatno, ispitana je i varijacija 
unutar pojedinačnih država za svaki pokazatelj. Rezultati pokazuju da je kod 
mortaliteta najveći jaz između dve grupe regiona. Mortalitetni uslovi su mnogo 
lošiji na istoku EU. Ova razlika postoji bez obzira na BDP/c, tj. ekonomski naj-
razvijeniji regioni bivših komunističkih zemalja imaju u proseku viši mortalitet 
od ostalih regiona sličnog BDP/c. Iako je fertilitet u proseku niži kod bivših regi-
ona komunističkih zemalja, velika razlika je detektovana samo kada je starosni 
model fertiliteta u pitanju. Prosečna starost majki pri rođenju je značajno veća u 
ostalim regionima i to bez obzira na BDP/c. Kada je u pitanju starosna struktura, 
bivši komunistički regioni su u proseku nešto mlađi, ne kao rezultat viših stopa 
fertiliteta, već viših stopa mortaliteta. Kada je u pitanju regionalna varijacija unu-
tar zemalja EU, mortalitet i starost majki pri rađanju variraju više kod bivših 
komunističkih država, dok su varijacije u odnosu starih i mladih veće kod država 
koje nisu pripadale Istočnom bloku. Analiza regionalne varijacije je pokazala da 
je regionalni pristup veoma relevantan kada se ispituju demografske razlike 
između „Istoka“ i „Zapada“ u EU. Regionalni pristup je naročito opravdan kada 
je u pitanju analiza starosnog modela rađanja.  
Ključne reči: bivše komunističke države, mortalitet, fertilitet, starenje, Evropa, 
NUTS 3 
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